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About “Justitia” (Righteousness)  
and “Aequitas” (Equity).  
The contribution of Lactantius († 325) 
in the specifying of the content  
of the two constituent elements  
of the “Jus”
Lactantius, a Roman North-African citizen,1 made a career as a rhetor in Numidia 
(Algeria), and as a Christian writer in Nicomidia (Bitinia), which was then the 
capital of that “Pars Orientis” of the Roman State.
By his apologetic work, written in Latin, Lactantius – who has been considered 
a “Christian Cicero” – contributed not just “to the structuring of the Christian 
Latin language,” but also “to the development of the Christian poetry of Latin 
 language…,”2 and to the affirmation of a new conception, of Christian origin, re-
garding the fundamental elements of the Jus, which he perceived according to the 
spirit of the Roman Law, yet always seeing and evaluating them through the prism 
of the Christian Teaching about God and man3 and about Moral Law.
About Lactantius († 325), it is known that he was one of the first pagan jurists, 
who, converted to Christianity, became not only a Christian Apologist, but also 
1 Regarding the life and the work of Lactantius († 325), “the rhetorical apologist of Christianity”, 
see S. G. Papadopoulos, Patrologie (Patrology), vol. 2/1, translated by A. Marinescu, Bucharest 2009, 
p. 97–101.
2 S. G. Papadopoulos, Patrologie, vol. 2/1, op. cit., p. 98.
3 See, N. V. Dură, Despre “Jus naturale”. Contribuţii filosofico-juridice (About “Jus naturale”. Phi-
losophical-juridical contributions), “Revista de Teologie Sfântul Apostol Andrei” (Theological Journal 
Saint Andrew the Apostle) 18 (2014) no. 1, p. 39–52.
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a remarkable Roman Law theorist. Thus, in the pages of this study, we shall pres-
ent – albeit briefly – the manner in which this Roman jurist of Proconsular Africa 
perceived not only the origin and the nature of “Jus,” as well as its goal, contents 
and representative values, but also the constitutive values of Moral Law, among 
which, “Justitia” and “Aequitas” are – according to Lactantius – the mains ones.
In the European juridical literature, the juridical-philosophical contribution 
of the formerly pagan magistrate, Lactantius, who became one of the first Christian 
jurists, is not yet fully known, and even less profitably used, although – among 
others things – we can attribute to him the syntagma “dignitas humana,”4 which 
has been put again into circulation not only by the humanists of the Renaissance, 
as Francesco Petrarch5 († 1374) and Giovanni Pico della Mirandolle6 († 1494), but 
also by the text of the first Constitution of the eu, namely the Treaty instituting 
a Constitution for Europe,7 published – in its first version – in Rome in the year 
2004, and then in Lisbon in the year 2007.
 “Justitia” and “Aequitas”  
according to the perception of Lactantius
Becoming a Christian, Lactantius turned into one of the remarkable Apologists 
of the Church, by means of which he answered – in an informed manner and using 
a language adequate for the respective epoch – to the furious attacks of the pagan 
world of its time, waged by outstanding intellectuals in the philosophical, literary 
and juridical field. It was precisely due to his artistry in the domains of classical 
4 See, N. V. Dură, Dreptul la demnitate umană (dignitas humana) şi la libertate religioasă. De la 
“Jus naturale” la “Jus cogens” (The Right to Human Dignity (Dignitas Humana) and to Religious Freedom. 
From “Jus naturale” to “Jus cogens”), “Analele Universităţii Ovidius. Seria: Drept şi Ştiinţe Administra-
tive” (Ovidius University Annals. Law and Administrative Sciences Series) 2006 no. 1, p. 86–128.
5 See, R. C. Morris, Petrarch, the first humanist, at: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/29/style
/29ihtconway_ed3_0.html (25.03.2017).
6 See, Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola, in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stan-
ford.edu/entries/pico-della-mirandola (12.11.2016).
7 See, C. Mititelu, Europe and the Constitutionalization Process of EU Member States, “Ovidius 
University Annals, Economic Sciences Series” 13 (2013) no. 2, p. 122–127; N. V. Dură, Principii şi nor-
me generale ale Dreptului Uniunii Europene privind protecţia juridică a drepturilor omului (Principles 
and General Norms of the eu Law regarding the Juridical Defense of Human Rights), in: RO-RUS- 
-NIPPONICA, vol. 1, Craiova 2010, p. 32–36.
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(Greek and Latin) literature, philosophy and Roman law that the author of “De 
Justitia” excelled and played an important role in the debates of his time.
A prolific writer, skilled in literature, law and philosophy, Lactantius wrote 
numerous works which “have not all been preserved. We know a part of them only 
from the titles enumerated by Saint Jerome.”8
One of these works was “Divinae Institutiones” (Divine Institutions), in 7 books, 
written between the years 304 and 313. The Book Iv, suggestively entitled “De Justi-
tia,” was probably elaborated for the Emperor Constantine by the time when Lactan-
tius arrived at his Court, namely between “the years 313–315,…,”9 when “Constantine’s 
Chancery was endeavoring to put into operation the new juridical system.”10
If this was indeed the reality, then it is not impossible that precisely Lactantius, 
by means of some of his works, such as “De mortibus persecutorum” and “De Justi-
tia” (About Justice), may have determined – directly or indirectly – the Emperor 
Constantine the Great to proclaim along with Licinius the Edict of Milan,11 by which 
the Christian Religion received the juridical status of “Religio licita” (permitted 
Religion) within the Roman Empire, and at the same time the Right to Religion12 
was acknowledged for all the subjects of the Roman Empire.
 8 S. G. Papadopoulos, Patrologie, vol. 2/1, op. cit., p. 98.
 9 P. Monat, Introduction, in: Lactance, Institutions Divines, V, I, introduction, texte critique, tra-
duction par P. Monat, Paris 1973, p. 15 (Sources Chrétiennes [=sC], 204).
10 P. Monat, Introduction, op. cit., p. 31.
11 See, N. V. Dură, Edictul de la Milan şi impactul lui asupra relaţiilor dintre Stat şi Biserică. Câteva 
consideraţii istorice, juridice şi ecleziologice (The Edict of Milan and its Impact on the Relations be-
tween State and Church. Some Historical, Juridical and Ecclesiological Considerations), “Mitropolia 
Olteniei” (The Metropolitan Bishopric of Oltenia) 64 (2012) nr. 5–8, p. 28–43; N. V. Dură, C. Mititelu, 
The Freedom of Religion and the Right to Religious Freedom, in: SGEM Conference on Political Sciences, 
Law, Finance, Economics & Tourism, vol. 1, Albena (Bulgaria) 2014, p. 831–838.
12 About this right, see N. V. Dură, Relaţiile Stat-Culte religioase în U.E. “Privilegii” şi “discriminări” 
în politica “religioasă” a unor State membre ale Uniunii Europene (The Relations State-Religious Cults 
in the eu. “Privileges” and “Discriminations” in the “Religious” Policy of Certain Member States of the 
European Union), “Analele Universităţii Ovidius. Seria: Drept şi Ştiinţe Administrative” (Ovidius 
University Annals. Law and Administrative Sciences Series) 2007 no. 1, p. 20–34; N. V. Dură, Les 
droits fondamentaux de l’homme et leur protection juridique, “Analele Universităţii Dunărea de Jos 
Galaţi” (Danube University Annals, Galaţi), Fascicle 22, Drept şi Administraţie publică (Law and Pu-
blic Administration) 2008 no. 2, p. 19–23; N. V. Dură, The Law no. 489/2006 on Religious Freedom 
and General Regime of Religious Cults in Romania, “Dionysiana” 2 (2008) no.1, p. 37–54; N. V. Dură, 
Statele Uniunii Europene şi cultele religioase (The States of the European Union and Religious Cults), 
“Ortodoxia” (The Orthodoxy) 1 (2009) no. 2, p. 49–72; N. V. Dură, Despre libertatea religioasă şi re-
gimul general al Cultelor religioase din România (About Religious Freedom and the General Regime 
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Until now, this aspect has not been noticed or retained in the specialized 
literature, including in the works of the theologians, historians and jurists 
of the Church, which obviously makes it necessary to research and to profit-
ably use any piece of documentary information on the life, work and activity 
of this illustrious Christian jurist, from Proconsular Africa, id est Lactantius, 
to whom we owe – among others – also the summoning of the juridical prin-
ciple of the Right to Religious Freedom, which – due to its influence on the 
Emperor Constantine the Great – was to be stated explicitly in the text of the 
Edict of Milan. Then, under the impact of this Edict, this principle was to be 
affirmed along the centuries in the text of numerous national, European and 
international legislations.
About Lactantius – who took over the fight, “already traditional during his 
epoch” against paganism, more precisely against its intellectual elite, – it has 
been stated that it “has the merit of having organized his battlefield better. Less 
tenacious than Tertullian, he proposes in exchange a much clearer and better 
ordered exposition.”13
This reality is especially clear in his work entitled “De justitia,” in which the 
argumentation is clear and penetrating, being supported both on the sources of the 
classical philosophy and literature (Greek and Latin), and also on those of the great 
Roman jurists and orators (Cicero, Lucretius, Virgilius, Seneca etc.).
Regarding the sources used in his work “De Justitia,” one can notice the fact 
that Cicero († 43 B.C.) and Saint Cyprian († 258) were his constant landmarks and 
references. Yet, he found inspiration as well in some jurists of Carthage who had 
preceded him, and who had been both theorists and practitioners of Roman Law, 
as, for example, the two christian jurists of the pagan world, namely, Tertullian 
of the Religious Cults in Romania), “Analele Universităţii Ovidius Constanţa / Seria Teologie” (Ovi-
diu University Annals, Constanţa, Theological Series) 7 (2009) no.1, p. 20–45; N. V. Dură, Legea 
no. 489/2006 privind libertatea religioasă şi regimul general al Cultelor religioase din România (Law 
no. 489/2006 on Religious Freedom and the General Regime of the Religious Cults of Romania), in: 
Biserica Ortodoxă şi Drepturile omului: Paradigme, fundamente, implicaţii (The Orthodox Church 
and Human Rights. Paradigms, Fundaments, Implications), Bucharest 2010, p. 290–311; N. V. Dură, 
Proselytism and the Right to Change Religion: The Romanian Debate, in: Law and Religion in the 21st 
Century. Relations between States and Religious Communities, eds. S. Ferrari, R. Cristofori, London 
2010, p. 279–290; N. V. Dură, Religious Freedom in Romania, “Theologia Pontica” 5 (2012) no. 3–4, 
p. 9–24.
13 P. Monat, Introduction, op. cit., p. 15.
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(† 240) and Minucius Felix († 250),14 both of Proconsular Africa, which was also 
the motherland of Lactantius.
The fact that Tertullian was a first hand source of documentary information for 
Lactantius is confirmed precisely by the latter’s affirmations about Rule of law and 
about Justice. For example, in his work, “De Justitia,” Lactantius affirms – among 
others – that “… justitiae vim in aequitate consistere”15 (the power of virtue resides 
in equity). But, more than half a century earlier, his predecessor, Tertullian († 240), 
had already stated that Rule of law and Justice reside in Equity (Aequitas),16 as Plato 
said already before him.
About Minucius Felix, Lactantius wrote that he was a “lawyer,”17 and about the 
lawyer Tertullian he wrote that the latter was also “… a master in all the literary 
genres.”18 But, in reality, Lactantius himself was also a lawyer, by education and 
profession, and also a master of the literary genres of Latin and Greek expression, 
just like Tertullian.
A master of the verb of Latin expression and skilled in juridical logic, Lactan-
tius proved as well familiar with the juridical-philosophical thinking, defined and 
expressed “ab antiquitatem” by the School of Roman Law by those brief “maxims” 
or “sentences” on “Jus” and its nature, known by the Roman jurists under the name 
of “Jurisprudentiae,” and which have remained veritable “summae” of juridical 
doctrine to this day.19
14 It is not known precisely when he died, yet it is estimated that the dialogue “Octavius,” written 
by Minucius Felix, was used both by Tertullian († 240), and by Saint Cyprian of Carthage († 258). (See 
Minucius Felix, Dialogul Octavius (The Dialogue Octavius), in: Apologeţi de limbă latină (Apologists 
of Latin Language), vol. 3, Bucharest 1981, p. 344–347).
15 Lactance (Lactantius), Institutions Divines (Divinae Institutiones) III, 21: Choix de Monu-
ments primitifs de l’Église Chrétienne: avec notices littéraires, Paris 1843 (Oeuvre numérisée par 
Marc  Szwajcer: http://remacle.org/bloodwolf/eglise/lactance/instit3.htm).
16 Tertullian, Apologeticum ad Gentes, Iv, in: Tertuliani opera omnia, accurante J.-P. Migne, Parisiis 
1844, p. 338 (Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Latina [= PL], 1).
17 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, I, 22, p. 132–133 (sC 204).
18 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, I, 23, op. cit., p. 132 (sC 204).
19 N. V. Dură, C. Mititelu, The right to Freedom of Religion in the Jurisprudence of the European 
Court, Journal of Danubius Studies and Reseaech 4 (2014) no.1, p. 141–152; N. V. Dură, C. Mititelu, 
Human Rights and their Universality. From the Rights of the “Individua” and of the “Citizen” to “Human” 
Rights, in: International Conference “Exploration, Education and Progress in the Third Millennium.” 
Proceedings, vol. 1, no. 4, Galaţi 2012, p. 103–127; N. V. Dură, C. Mititelu, Principii şi norme ale Drep-
tului Uniunii Europene privind drepturile omului şi protecţia lor juridică / Principles and rules of EU law 
on human rights and their legal protection, Constanţa 2014.
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About “Justitia” (Justice), Lactantius wrote that “aut ipsa est summa virtus aut 
fons est ipse virtutis”20 (it is either the supreme virtue or the very source of virtue). 
Therefore, according to Lactantius, Justice – as a Virtue – contains all the other, 
being at the same time their source.
The same Christian apologist and jurist mentioned however the fact that al-
though “Justitia” (Justice) includes all the others, yet only two are its main consti-
tutive virtues, namely, Piety (Pietas) and Equity (Aequitas). Actually, we can say 
that for Lactantius these two virtues were “… like two arteries of justice. In these 
two consists the whole Justice.”21
According to Lactantius, “Justitia” (Justice) “… was the object of research not only 
for philosophers (non modo philosophi), but also for poets (sed poetae quoque) 
who preceded them long before (qui priores multo fuerunt), and who were given 
the title of wisemen before the term of philosophy appeared (et ante natum phi-
losophiae nomen pro sapientibus habebantur).22
Indeed, regarding this supreme virtue, “Justitia” (Justice), – which for Lactan-
tius was precisely “Fons virtutis” (the spring of virtue) – the first who talked about 
it were the poets, then the philosophers and the jurists of the Antiquity.
For Socrates, for example, – who affirmed that Law is the conformity with 
Goodness – “… law itself, unwritten law, comes from the Gods… For this reason, 
with all men, the first rule of law is to honor the Gods.”23 Consequently, according 
to the perception of Socrates, natural laws, namely unwritten Law, are in conform-
ity with the will of the Gods. This conformity with the divine will did not exclude, 
however, the existence of the “rational Law,” elaborated, naturally, by the human 
spirit, identified by Plato with “Νομον” (Law) and with “Ἀληθήν” (Truth),24 which 
is the supreme virtue.
According to some philosophers, Socrates turned “virtue into a science,” and 
identified “the practice of good with the knowledge we have about good, preparing 
in this way the doctrine that will absorb moral life in the rational exercise of think-
ing. Never was a higher rank attributed to reason.”25 But, even though Socrates, like 
20 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 5, 1, op. cit., p. 150 (sC 204).
21 L. Stan, Ontologia Juris, Sibiu 1943, p. 117.
22 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 5, 1, op. cit., p. 150 (sC 204).
23 Xenofon, Memorabilia, Iv, 4 § 19, apud L. Stan, Ontologia Juris, op. cit., p. 71.
24 Platon, Minos, Iv, 314, 315, 317; IX, 317, apud L. Stan, Ontologia Juris, op. cit., p. 72, n. 2.
25 H. Bergson, Cele două surse ale Moralei şi Religiei (The Two Sources of Morals and Religion), 
translated by D. Morăraşu, Iaşi 1998, p. 84.
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other poets and philosophers who preceded him, situated “virtues” in the noetic 
or in the cognitive sphere, however, he did not “absorb” moral life in the rational 
exercise of thinking. On the contrary, he related it to its original source, namely 
to the will of Divinity.
This reality is explained as well by the conception of Socrates according to which 
the philosopher’s mission is one “of a religious and mystical order, in the sense 
that we give to these words today. His teaching, so perfectly rational, is related 
to something that seems to go beyond pure reason…”26 But, it is precisely due 
to this religious and mystical character of these values that Socrates went beyond 
the rational thinking, the thinking of the philosophical systems, a thinking “… that 
seems to have never succeeded in explaining – as Henri Bergson admitted – how 
Morals can draw to it so many souls.”27
As we have already mentioned, according to Lactantius, “Justitia” (Justice) 
is made up of “pietas” and “aequitas.”28 And, according to the opinion of some ex-
egetes of his work, Lactantius must have taken the notion of “pietas” from Hermes 
Trismeghistos,29 for whom “pietas nihil aliud quam Dei notio” (piety is but knowl-
edge of God), putting an equal sign between, “εὐσἑβεία” and “γνῶσις τοῦ Θεoῦ,” 
namely between “piety” and the act of “knowledge of God.”
In our opinion, Lactantius could take over the notion of “pietas” rather from 
Cicero (106 B.C. – 43 B.C.), who talked about “pietas adversus Deos,” namely about 
piety or respect for the Gods. But, both for Vergilius (70 B.C. – 19 B.C.) and for Cice-
ro, the notion of “pietas/tis” has however as well the sense of “justice” (justitiam) 
of divine origin.30 In fact, both Vergilius and Cicero were as well largely tributary – 
in matters of philosophical knowledge – to Plato, for whom “piety” (εὐσεβεία) and 
“holiness” (ὅσιον) were constitutive elements “τοῦ δίκαῖον” (of Law) (Euthyphon, 12). 
In other words, Plato related Law to moral values, because – for him – the very 
nature of Law was dependent on “moral order,” and, consequently, “Dikeon” (Jus) 
appeared first of all as a moral normative value, related to “piety” – perceived 
 especially in the sense of justice – and to holiness.
26 H. Bergson, Cele două surse, op. cit., p. 84.
27 H. Bergson, Cele două surse, op. cit., p. 87.
28 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 14, 9, op. cit., p. 202–204 (sC 204).
29 P. Monat, Introduction, op. cit., p. 60.
30 See G. Guţu, Dicţionar latin-român (Latin-Romanian Dictionary), Bucharest 1983, p. 914–915.
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According to the conception of the Greek philosophers of the Antiquity, justice 
was considered to be “δικαιοσύνη νομοθετκἤ”31 (legislative justice), namely “in the 
sense of legislator or source of law, wherefrom it results that positive Law actually 
derives from Justice,” which is “realization of νόμος, the one revealed by τὸ Ὄν,…”32
Regarding “Aequitas,” it has been said that it precedes positive Law (Jus posi- 
tivum), namely written Law, because the profound sense of this notion is that 
of a Justice involving both the equality of all people in front of God, and the relation 
between Law and Justice, a concern both for the philosophers of the Antiquity (the 
Stoics, above all Cicero) and for the Roman jurists.
Among others, in their Edict of Milan, of the year 313, the Emperors Constan-
tine and Licinius also highlighted the fact that the preoccupation for “justice” and 
“equity” must pass before the interest for respecting Law, that is the laws. “Placu-
it in omnibus rebus praecipuam esse justitiae aequitatisque quam stricti iuris 
rationem” (Codex Justinianus 3, 1, 8). Therefore, for the two Roman Emperors, 
“justitia” and “aequitas” prevailed in front of “Jus,” namely in front of Law. But, it is 
not impossible that this conception of the two Roman Emperors, concerning the 
relation between “jus,” “justitita” and “aequitas,” may come from Lactantius himself, 
whom the Emperor Constantine the Great actually called to the Imperial Palace 
of Treveri (Trier) to be teacher for his son Krispos33.
We also need to emphasize and keep in mind the fact that the notion of “hu-
manitas/tis” was perceived and defined by the Romans also as a “(moral) duty, 
an obligation”34 of the moral Law. But, it is precisely in this sense, of moral duty, 
that we find this notion also in the work of Lactantius, who actually affirmed that 
“the roles of justice (officia justitiae)” are “moral duty, equity and charity (humanitas, 
aequitas, misericodia).”
For Lactantius, “equity” is therefore one of the “roles” or “functions” of Justice, 
being preceded by “humanitas” and followed by “misericordia.” All these three 
“roles” or “functions” of “justice” (justitiae) were however perceived by Lactantius 
as three representative virtues of the christian moral Law,35 whose principles were 
actually fully highlighted by him in his work “De Justitia.”
31 Platon, Gorgias, p. 464, apud L. Stan, Ontologia Juris, op. cit., p. 74.
32 L. Stan, Ontologia Juris, op. cit., p. 74.
33 See S. G. Papadopoulos, Patrologie, vol. 2/1, op. cit., p. 98.
34 G. Guţu, Dicţionar, op. cit., p. 829.
35 About this Christian moral Law and its sources, see also H. Bergson, Cele două surse, op. cit., 
p. 84.
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Initially, by the notion of “Justitia/ae,” the Romans expressed the idea of “correct 
accomplishment of the duties to the gods (erga deos),” and then the idea of “justice” 
in the sense of “correctness” and of “court.”36 But, quite often, “Justice” was applied 
only in its most rigorous sense possible, that is with “Acrivia,” consequently be-
coming “summa iniuria” (the greatest injustice) even in the See of the Confession.37
According to the definition left by Aristotle, “… ἡ δικαιοσύνη” (justice) is 
“… ἀρετἡ δἰ ἣν τὰ αὐτῶν ἔκαστοι ἔχουσι, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος”38 (the virtue by which everyone 
receives what is his, as the law requires). So, pursuant to the conception of Aristot-
le, the act of justice is subordinated to the virtue of justice, which as a sum of all 
virtues also represents “summum bonum,” and consequently, “… serves as a norm 
and supreme censor of juridical justice,” which the respective philosopher actually 
defines as being an application of the law by which everyone is given what is his 
(τὰ αὐτῶν ἔκαστοι ἔχουσι). Or, according to the terms of Ulpianus (170 – 223), the 
famous Roman jurist, “suum cuique tribuere” (Digestae I, 1, 10; Institutiones I, 1 § 3), 
id est to give everyone what is his.
From Cicero, Lactantius retained that a philosopher of Greek language, namely 
Carneades († 128 BC), would have written that “men (homines) gave themselves 
laws (iura) according to their interest (pro sibi utilitate); these laws differ, how- 
ever, apparently, due to customs (pro moribus), and, within the same people, they 
change according to the epoch (pro temporibus)…” The same Carneades would have 
stated – according to Cicero – that “there is no natural law (ius autem naturale esse 
nullum); all men and all living beings are determined naturally to look for what 
is useful (omnes et homines et alias animantes ad utilitates suas natura ducente 
ferri); this is why, – Carneades apodictically concluded – there is no justice (nul-
lam esse justitiam), or, if there is any, it is overwhelmed by stupidity (stultitiam), 
because it would hurt itself protecting the interesets of another.”39
According to the conception of Carneades, natural Justice (iustitia naturale) 
was therefore accused of “stupidity,” wherefrom his exclusive praise of “civil justice” 
36 G. Guţu, Dicţionar, op. cit., p. 671.
37 C. Mititelu, The application of Epitimias in the See of Confession according to the “Canonical 
Custom” and the “Penitential Canons”, “Teologia Młodych” 2015 nr 4, p. 10–18.
38 Aristotel, Rhetorica, I, 9, apud L. Stan, Ontologia Juris, op. cit., p. 77–78.
39 Apud Lactance, Divinae Institutiones V, XvII, B, in: Lactantii opera omnia, accurante J.-P. Migne, 
Parisiis 1844, p. 602 [PL 6]; Cicero, De Republica, III, Xv, p. 24, 11, in: Opera quae supersunt omnia 
ac deperditorum fragmenta, ed. I. C. Orellius, vol. 4, issue 1, Turici 1828, p. 465.
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(iustitiae civilis), actually identified with the virtue of “sapientiae”40 (wisdom). But, 
for Lactantius, “justitia civilis” (the justice of civil Law) was in fact nothing but 
a “justitiam,” namely a juridical justice, because it did not originate “in Religione” 
(in Religion), and, consequently, did not have the quality of moral virtue.
Lactantius actually remarked the fact that both “Plato et Aristoteles” (Plato 
and Aristotle) “… wanted to offer justice (iustitiam), and that they could have even 
obtained some good results if their general efforts, their eloquence (eloquentiam) 
and their praise-worth talent would have been reinforced by the learning of the 
divine things (divinarum quoque rerum doctrina)”41 that Theology talks about. 
Consequently, by “opus illorum” (their work) – as Lactantius wrote – “nec cui-
quam hominum persuadere potuerent ut euorum praescripto vivere” (they did not 
manage to convince any man to live according to their precepts), because “quia 
fundamentum a coelo disciplina illa non habuit” (their philosophical system was 
not founded in heaven).42 In fact, only “the Science” having its “fundamentum 
a celo” is the Christian Theology, namely “the Science about God and about the 
divine things,”43 which Lactantius found in the sacred pages of the Word of God, 
namely in the Bible.
The same writer of Latin language from Proconsular Africa, Lactantius, – rhetor 
and jurist by training – wrote that “justice” (justitia) did not take refuge “ad Iouis 
regnum” (in the kingdom of Jupiter), but “was chased away from earth (in terra) 
by Jupiter (a Ioue), he who – the Christian apologist concluded – bewildered the 
golden age (aureum seculum),”44 namely that up to Saturn.
According to the words of the same christian jurist, this “golden age was corrupt 
even since the beginning of Jupiter’s reign (Iove primum regnante corruptum), 
and disappeared as soon as he himself and all his descendants were consecrated 
as gods (omni eius progenie consecrata deorumque) and the cult of a multitude 
of gods was set up.”45
40 Apud Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 16, 12, op. cit., p. 212–213 (sC 204).
41 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 17, 4, op. cit., p. 214–215 (sC 204).
42 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 17, 4–5, op. cit., p. 214–215 (sC 204).
43 See N. V. Dură, Teologie şi teologii. Teologia ortodoxă şi noile curente teologice (Theology and 
Theologies. The Orthodox Theology and the New Theological Trends), “Ortodoxia” (The Orthodoxy) 
38 (1986) no. 4, p. 46–78; N. V. Dură, The Theology of Conscience and the Philosophy of Conscience, 
„Philosophical-Theological Reviewer” 2011 no. 1, p. 20–29.
44 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 6, 11, op. cit., p. 158–159 (sC 204).
45 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 6, 13, op. cit., p. 160–161 (sC 204).
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Moreover, in the perception of Lactantius, “the chasing away of justice” – from 
earth – must be seen as an “abandonment of the divine Religion (desertio divinae 
religiones), the only one that – he mentioned – makes man love man (ut homo 
hominem carum habeat) and feel closely united to his fellow by a fraternal bond 
(fraternitate vincolo).”46
This “divine Religion” is the Christian Religion,47 which made out of the 
“love” of God an act of knowledge of God (cf. John 17:3), or – according to Lactan- 
tius – a “Dei notio” (a knowledge of God). Actually, this “Religion of love” – called 
in this way because “God is love” (1 John 4:8) – made out of the love for our fellows 
an act of acknowledge of “the other” (alterum) – and, ipso facto, – a “sine qua non” 
 condition of our redemption.
For Lactantius, “Justitia” (Justice) is the “highest virtue (summae virtus),” having 
its “origin in Religion (origo in Religie) and its reason to be in equity (ratio in ae- 
quitate est).”48 However, “although justice simultaneously encompasses all the other 
virtues (omnes virtutes), only two are principal (principales), which can be neither 
cut off nor separated: piety (pietas) and equity (aequitas),”49 considered by Lactan-
tius “two sources (fontes) from which the whole justice (tota iustitia) springs: yet 
the principle (caput) and the origin (origo) reside in the first,” namely in “pietas,” 
which, in his terms, – taken over from Plato and from Trismegistus – “nihil aliud 
est quam Dei notio,…” (is nothing else but the knowledge of God).50
Therefore, according to Lactantius, “Justice” has two springs, namely, “pietas” 
and “aequitas,” and it is from them that “tota Justitia,” namely the whole act of doing 
Justice, ought to spring.
As far as the “second” virtue is concerned, namely “equity,” Lactantius tells 
us that it is “the power (vis) and the rational ground (ratio)”51 of any virtue. Con-
sequently, this “pietas” – understood first of all as respect to the Divinity – con-
sists – according to Lactantius – “cognoscere Deum” (in learning to know God), 
and knowledge (cognitio) involves a cult (ut colas) of adoring God, wherefrom his 
apodictic conclusion: “… he who does not practice God’s Religion (Religionem Dei 
46 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 6, 12, op. cit., p. 158–159 (sC 204).
47 See N. V. Dură, Love in the Christian Religion. Testimonies of the Theology of the Eastern 
 Orthodox Church, “Dionysiana” 2 (2008) no. 1, p. 420–433.
48 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 14, 7, op. cit., p. 200–201 (sC 204).
49 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 14, 9, op. cit., p. 202–203 (sC 204).
50 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 14, 11, op. cit., p. 202–203 (sC 204).
51 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 14, 11, op. cit., p. 202–203 (sC 204).
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non tenet) certainly ignores justice (ignorat utique iustitiam).”52 He was certainly 
referring to the “Religion” of the True God, of “the Living God,” – in whose name the 
Prophet Elijah spoke as well (cf. III Kings, chap. 17–19) – and not about the “Religion 
of the gods” (deorum religiones), or the “cult of the gods,” which – according to the 
affirmation of Lactantius – are contrary to devotion (quia contrariae sunt pietati).”53
Among others, Lactantius also highlighted the fact that “… Plato talked a lot 
about a unique God (de uno Deo), by Whom, according to him, the world was 
created, yet he does not speak at all about Religion (sed nihil de Religione).” But, “if 
he himself or anyone else would have wanted to speak in defense of justice (iustitiae 
defensionem), they should have started by totally getting rid of the cult of the gods, 
as they are contrary to piety (contrariae pietati).”54 And, according to the testimony 
of Lactantius, this thing – namely to get rid of the faith in gods – “was attempted 
(tentavit) by Socrates (Socrates), and, for this reason, he was put in prison (in 
carcerem coniectus est). And, since then, – Lactantius concluded – appeared as well 
the unhappy sort in store for the people who put themselves in the service of the 
defense of true justice (iustitiam veram defendere) and in the service of the unique 
God (Deoque singulari servire).”55
According to the affirmation of Lactantius, Socrates would be, therefore, the 
first of the Greek philosophers who would have tried to get rid of the worship given 
to the gods, yet, both he and Plato, his disciple, did not manage to discover the 
Unique and True God of Moses and Elijah.
The philosophy of Law tells us that, “… the subjective rights of only one person 
concern all the people, all the subjects of law possible, and each of them equally,” 
and, by this, it is actually highlighted “the moral equality of all men,” because, if they 
“… did not feel equal, they would not be able to affirm their equality in rights.”56
Therefore, “Moral equality” is perceived as “equality” of all the subjects of law. 
But, for Lactantius, “aequitas” (equity) is only the other side of justice (altera 
iustitiae pars)57, and not “moral equality.” Consequently, he did not define it as 
the power of judging well (bene iudicandi), but, taking over the definition of Cice-
ro, – who called it “aequabilitatem” (disposition to equity) – considered it a virtue, 
52 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 14, 12, op. cit., p. 202–203 (sC 204).
53 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 14, 13, op. cit., p. 202–203 (sC 204).
54 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 14, 13, op. cit., p. 202–203 (sC 204).
55 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 14, 14, op. cit., p. 202–203 (sC 204).
56 L. Stan, Ontologia Juris, op. cit., p. 37.
57 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 14, 15, op. cit., p. 202–203 (sC 204).
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based on which we are “called to be equal to the others (cum ceteris coaequandi),”58 
namely to our fellow-men.
In the register of the Christian doctrine, the syntagm of Cicero, and its con-
tent, acquired other meanings, that Lactantius had in view as well when he stated 
that “God, who created people and breathed life in them, wanted them all to live 
in equity, namely to be equal (omnes aequos, id est pares);” for this reason, He 
“… promised them all immortality (immortalitatem); none was excluded from his 
celestial benefactions (a beneficiis eius caelestibus segregatur).”59
Among others, Lactantius wrote also that “by his very nature, man is sociable 
and meant to do what is good (socialis est hominis ac benefica natura), and that 
this nature is the one that makes him akin to God (cum Deo).”60 Man is therefore 
by his nature sociable and meant to do only what is good and these features truly 
highlight the fact that by grace (κατα χαριν), man acquires something from the 
divine nature and consequently becomes “οἰκονα τοῦ Χριστοῦ” (image of Christ).
Consequently, it is not wondering the fact that “for God … no one is slave, no one 
is master: since He is – mentioned Lactantius – for all a Parent, and we are all His 
children, enjoying equal rights (aequo iure).”61 Then, Lactantius adds the men-
tion that, “where (people) do not have the same rights (universi pares), indeed, 
there is no equality (aequalitas), and this inequality (inaequalitas) itself excludes 
justice (iustitiam), whose force resides in the fact of making equal (pares) those 
who, coming in this life (ad huius vitae), were established in the same condition 
(condicionem pari sorte).”62
This “aequalitas” was therefore understood by Lactantius as a natural state, 
which imposed, based on “jus naturale” – perceived and defined by the Roman 
jurisconsults of the IInd century as “jus quod natura omnia animalia docuit …”63 (the 
law that all the beings learnt from nature) – equality among men.
This conception of humanist-christian origin, about equality among all men, 
regardless of their ethnic origin, of their social status, of their religion etc., was 
expressed by Lactantius convincingly throughout his whole work “De Justitia,” 
58 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 14, 15, op. cit., p. 204–205 (sC 204).
59 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 14, 16, op. cit., p. 204–205 (sC 204).
60 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 17, 34, op. cit., p. 222–223 (sC 204).
61 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 14, 17, op. cit., p. 204–205 (sC 204).
62 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 14, 20, op. cit., p. 204–205 (sC 204).
63 Apud Justiniani Institutiones, lb. I, II.
22 Nicolae V. Dură
where the Right to “dignitas humana”64 (human dignity) is a natural right of every 
human being, namely a “natural Law” (Jus naturale), “… manifested and affirmed 
by means of human reason.”65 Thus, the natural Law was situated at “the basis 
of the whole edifice of Roman Law, and has found its continual application along 
the centuries, maintaining untarnished the effigy of its divine principle, which 
finally summarizes it.”66
The compassion of Lactantius to the disinherited of fate, of his time, was certain-
ly due to the fact that he had become a Christian. In this quality, in Nicomidia, the 
capital of the Eastern Roman Empire, – where he had been called by the Emperor 
Diocletianus, “shortly after 290,…, to teach Latin rhetoric,”67 – he was able to notice 
not so much the social gap between slave masters and their slaves, but, first of all, 
their lack of freedom and justice, wherefrom his natural reaction, motivated as well 
by the Word of Christ’s Evangel.
These realities, namely “freedom” and “justice,” have been perceived and respect-
ed diversely and differently since “illo tempore” (that time) to our days, when man’s 
fundamental rights and freedoms68 have become a major and primordial concern 
both for the European and international legislator, and for the national one.
Lactantius was leaving Nicomidia “… at the beginning of the persecution (303), …, 
after having accepted to be Christian.”69 And, as it is known, the Christian Religion 
was – even since its foundation – the only Religion that spread the message of the 
common origin of mankind, of universal fraternity, and, ipso facto, of equality 
64 Regarding this right, see N. V. Dură, Dreptul la demnitate umană (dignitas humana) (The Right 
to Human Dignity (Dignitas Humana)), op. cit., p. 86–128.
65 L. Stan, Ontologia Juris, op. cit., p. 99.
66 L. Stan, Ontologia Juris, op. cit., p. 99.
67 S. G. Papadopoulos, Patrologie, vol. 2/1, op. cit., p. 98.
68 On the history of their perception, and on their juridical nature, see N. V. Dură, Drepturile 
şi libertăţile omului în gândirea juridică europeană. De la “Justiniani Institutiones” la “Tratatul instituind 
o Constituţie pentru Europa” (Man’s Rights and Freedoms in the European Juridical Thinking. From “Ju-
stiniani Institutiones” to the “Treaty instituting a Constitution for Europe”), “Ovidius University Annals. 
Law and Administrative Sciences Series” 2006 no. 1, p. 129–151; N. V. Dură, The European Juridical 
Thinking, concerning the Human Rights, Expressed along the Centuries, “Acta Universitatis Danubius. Ju-
ridica” 2010 no. 2, p. 153–192; N. V. Dură, The Fundamental Rights and Liberties of Man in the E.U. Law, 
“Dionysiana” 4 (2010) no. 1, p. 431–464; C. Mititelu, The Right to Life. From the Prevention of Torture 
and Inhuman Punishment to the Abolition of the Death Penalty, “Ovidius University Annals, Economic 
Sciences Series” 13 (2013) no. 2, p. 128–133; C. Mititelu, The Human Rights and the Social Protection 
of Vulnerable Individuals, “Journal of Danubius Studies and Research” 2 (2012) no. 1, p. 70–77.
69 S. G. Papadopoulos, Patrologie, vol. 2/1, op. cit., p. 98.
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 between races, nations and peoples (cf. Gal. 3:28). As the philosopher Henri Bergson 
also noticed, “not even one of the stoics, not even the one who was emperor, ever 
thought that it would be possible to remove the barriers between free men and 
slaves, between barbarians and Roman citizens. Christianism had to come up for 
the idea of universal brotherhood, involving equality in rights and inviolability 
of the person, to become truly active.”70
The Apostles were indeed sent by our Savior Jesus Christ to preach the Gospel 
to all the nations (cf. Mt. 28: 19), because the Lord became man for all the people, 
regardless of their nationality, gender, social status etc., to make them one in Him 
by faith. This is why, “… here is no longer Jew or Greek, circumcision or uncircum-
cision, Scythian, bond or free, but Christ is all and in all” (Col. 3: 11; cf. Gal. 3: 28).
In his “Georgica,” Virgilius († 19 B.C.) wrote that, once, “it was considered a sac-
rilege to put landmarks or draw boundaries: they (people, our note) put everything 
in common” (I, 126–127).
Commenting on Virgilius, Lactantius also confirms that in the times of yore, 
people did not need boundaries and setting of boundaries, because “… Deus 
communem omnibus terram dedisset” (God had given the land to be used 
by all men in common), to live the same life in common (communem degerent 
vitam) and they did not need a raging and crazy avidity (greed) either to claim 
everything for itself (non ut rabida et furens avaritia sibi omnis vindicaret), or to 
deprive everyone of what was produced for all (nec ulli deesset quod omnibus 
nasceretur).”71
This is therefore the reason why, in the times of yore, neither norms of law 
were needed to regulate people’s rights and obligations, nor criminal laws were 
necessary, this is why people “in illo tempore” (in those times) – Lactantius wrote – 
believed that “Justitia” (Justice) was not from “this world,” and that because of “vitiis 
 hominum” (people’s vices) it “in caelumque migrasse” (migrated in heaven).72
The same Christian jurist, Lactantius, wrote – around the beginning of the sec-
ond decennium of the Ivth century – that, in those times, when “justice was present 
and ruled (praesente ac vigente iustitia) in the City, it was not preoccupied “by its 
own defense (de tutela sui), because “nobody was setting traps to it, or plotting 
70 H. Bergson, Cele două surse, op. cit., p. 99.
71 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 5, 6, op. cit., p. 152–153 (sC 204). 
72 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 5, 2, op. cit., p. 150–151 (sC 204).
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the fall of the other (de pernicie alterius cogitaret) or showing concupiscence 
(quicuam concupisceret).”73
Regarding the affirmation of the poet Virgilius, Lactantius wanted to underline 
that it must not be understood in the sense that, “in those times,” there would 
have been no “private goods” (privati), and that “… people were so “generous” (libe- 
rales) that they neither “… locked the products that the field produced for them, 
nor hid them only for themselves (… fruges non includerent nec soli absconditis 
incubarent), but shared with those in need (the poor) the product of their work 
(sed pauperes ad communionem laboris admitterrent).”74
Therefore, in the beginning, the “liberals,” that is the generous people, shared 
their private goods with those in need, since, in those times, there were no people 
greedy. So, “no wonder that, since the fortune “of the just” (iustorum) was gen-
erously made available “ omnibus” (for all), – underlined Lactantius – there were 
no people greedy to make theirs “beneficia divina” (the divine benefactions) and 
“cause famine and thirst among the people (famen sitique vulgo faceret), but they 
were all equal in abundance (sed omnes aequaliter abundarent), and those who 
had, donated abundantly and generously to those who had nothing (cum habentes 
non habentibus large copioseque donarent).”75
Both the confessions of Vergilius and of Lactantius – two tutelar spirits of the 
culture of mankind – confirm therefore the fact that, in the beginning, people were 
equal because they did not have the sense of possession, bringing with it injustice 
and social inequality, but were indeed “liberales,” namely generous, as those who 
claim to be “liberal” these days ought really to be.
According to the Aeneid of Vergilius, King Saturn would have been dethroned 
by his son, and so he ended up “in Latium (in Latiumque)” (8, 320). And, according 
to the testimony of Lactantius, “… since then, the people (populus), either fearing 
the new king, or spontaneously corrupted, would have stopped honoring God 
(Deum colere disisset),…,” being practically also “exemplo ceteris esset ad violan-
dam pietatem” (for the others an example of violation of devotion).76 But, “… as the 
worship of God disappeared (Dei religione),” they (people) also lost “the science 
of what is good and what is wrong” (Gen. 2, 17). And so both the communion of life 
73 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 5, 5, op. cit., p. 152–153 (sC 204).
74 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 5, 7, op. cit., p. 152–153 (sC 204).
75 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 5, 8, op. cit., p. 152–155 (sC 204).
76 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 5, 9, op. cit., p. 154–155 (sC 204).
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(communitas vitae) among men and the pact (covenant) of the human society (et 
diremptum est foedus societatis humanae) were put to an end. Then they (people) 
began… to set up traps and build their own glory (gloriam sibi) by shedding human 
blood (ex humano sanguine comparare).”77
Since in some works of “dogmatic Theology” (Textbooks, Treaties, Manuals, 
Studies etc.) we can still find some awkward explanations of the text from Genesis, 
chapter II, verse 17, and sometimes even totally alien to the authentic spirit of the 
Teaching of faith, we need to explicitly refer to the comment that Lactantius made 
around the beginning of the Ivth century in his work “De Justitia.”
Among others, in his comment, Lactantius wrote that people lost the possibility 
of “knowing” what is good and what is evil the moment when their communion 
with God stopped. This communion had been expressed since the beginning by the 
worship offered to God by the forefathers of the human nation, Adam and Eve.
According to the statement of Lactantius, it is precisely the absence of this 
communion that brought with it the disappearance of “God’s Religion,” and, 
 consequently, their spiritual death.
The fact that this death was not a physical one is actually attested as well by Phi-
lo of Alexandria (20 B.C. – 50 A.D.) based on the testimonies of the Old-Testa-
ment Tradition. He convincingly stated that “this refers to the death of the soul 
(Leg. I, 105–107; also Origen, Hom. Gen. Xv, 2). Others (Justin, Dialogue with 
cu Trypho, 81), who interpret a “day” of God as having 1000 years, say that Adam 
did not reach the end of the first millennial “day” (dying at the age of 930).”78
The dogmatist theologians of the Orthodox Church usually say that the sin 
of disobedience to God triggered the death of our forefathers, and, by them, of the 
whole human nation. At the same time, they state that “death and corruption 
are, on the one hand, part of the human nature, when they remain in relation 
to God, natural to nature, whereas, on the other hand, they are contrary to the 
aspiration of the human nature made out of nothing, when nature remains 
in itself”79 (sic).
According to the conception of the respective theologians, man was therefore 
destined to death and corruption “ab initio.” This is why we consider that the 
77 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 5, 13–14, op. cit., p. 154–155 (sC 204).
78 Apud Septuaginta. Geneza II, 17, coord. by C. Bădiliţă et. al., Iaşi 2004, p. 58.
79 D. Stăniloae, Teologia dogmatică ortodoxă (Orthodox Dogmatic Theology), 1, 2
nd
 ed., Bucharest 
1996, p. 284.
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exegesis of the text from Genesis 2: 17 – left by Lactantius – is much clearer and 
in agreement with the biblical exegesis of Jewish and proto-Christian origin, ac-
cording to which the text does not refer to a physical death, but to a spiritual one, 
as the saint Justin the Martyr and Philosopher († 165), Origen († 254) and other 
writers and theologians of the pre-Nicean Church confess.
The same Christian jurist of North Africa, Lactantius, insisted on the fact 
that “the source of all evils was cupidity (omnium malorum fons cupiditas erat), 
“born from the contempt for the true divine Glory (ex contemptu verae Maiestatis 
 erupit),”80 and that people, striving “to reduce the others to the bond of slavery 
(servitio ceteris subiugarent), decided first of all to detour and then to gather the 
goods necessary for life and keep them carefully (in a closed place)…”81
According to the affirmation of Lactantius, people established laws “for their 
profit, in the name of injustice (iustitiae) and of inequitable and unjust laws 
(leges iniquissimas iniustissimasque) to protect their robberies and their greed 
against the acts of violence of the multitudes (rapinas et avaritiam suam con-
tra vim multitudinis tuerentur),”82 and this type of men “… placed themselves 
on top of the others due to their bodyguards, their arms and the brilliance 
of their apparel (altioresque se ceteris hominibus satellitum comitatu et ferro 
et insigni veste).”83
Certainly, we could say that, from the epoch of Lactantius to ours days, “nihil 
novum sub sole.”
Lactantius also mentioned the fact that, “for their profit,” the emperor’s subjects 
who had dethroned Saturn, “invented magistrate’s offices, purple apparels and 
fascias to base their power on the fear created by axes and swords, and ordered as if 
they had had sovereign rights (iure dominorum) over the spirits struck by terror.”84 
Thus, the members of the Magistrates’ Body – dressed in purple habits just like 
the priests serving in the temples dedicated to the god Jupiter, the god of Justice, – 
based their power on those “fasces,”85 namely on the use of those bundles of birch 
rods, bound together using a belt, in which a hatchet was stuck, and which were 
80 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 6, 1, op. cit., p. 156–157 (sC 204).
81 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 6, 2, op. cit., p. 156–157 (sC 204).
82 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 6, 3, op. cit., p. 156 (sC 204).
83 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 6, 4, op. cit., p. 156 (sC 204).
84 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 6, 5, op. cit., p. 156 (sC 204).
85 See G. Guţu, Dicţionar, op. cit., p. 463.
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carried by lictors86 walking in front of the praetors and the magistrates invested 
with “imperium,” as a sign of their right to punish.
In his Book, “De justitia,” Lactantius also tells us that, beginning with the epoch 
of that tyrant, – who deprived his father of his royal throne – “… no remainder of the 
devotion and the honesty established during the previous centuries (antecedentis 
saeculi)” remained, and, consequently, “the justice chased away triggered with it the 
fall of the truth (explosa iustitia et veritatem secum trahens), leaving to people 
error, ignorance and blindness (hominibus errorem, ignoratiam, caecitatem).”87
Lactantius assures us that “Justitia” (Justice) cannot be looked for and found 
except by those with a spirit “of equity and goodness (aequi ac boni), which sup-
poses removing from our hearts “any bad thought” (malam cogitationem) and 
honoring “the true God (Deum Verum).”88 Actually, Lactantius insisted on telling 
us that even for Cicero,89 “any evil by means of which mankind (humanum genus) 
could disappear comes only from the unjust and unrespectful worship of the gods 
(iniustus atque impius deorum cultus).”90
According to Lactantius, the divine law is enough to govern mankind. “… To 
govern people – he wrote – one does not need so many (tam multis) and so vari-
ous laws (et tam variis legibus), because, it alone, the law of God (Dei lex), would 
be enough to attain perfect innocence; no prisons (carceribus), no arms (gladiis), 
no governors (praesidum) and no terror of punishment would be needed if the 
celestial commandments of God spread in the heart of men developing works 
of justice (iustitiae opera).”91
The same Christian jurist of Latin language said that “the conscience of sin (pec-
cate conscientia) and the fear of punishment (metus poenae) make you even more 
religious (religiosiorem facit), and faith (fides) is always much stronger (semper 
multo firmior) when it is restored by penitence (poenitentia).”92
86 The lictor (lictor/ris) was not only the company of a magistrate vested with “imperium”, namely 
with jurisdictional power, but also the defender and executor of his orders (cf. G. Guţu, Dicţionar, 
op. cit., p. 702).
87 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 6, 10, op. cit., p. 158–159 (sC 204).
88 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 8, 3, op. cit., p. 164–165 (sC 204).
89 Lactantius quoted from “De Legibus”, frg. 1. See M. T. Ciceronis, De Legibus libri. Fragmenta, 1, 
ed. I. Vahleni, Berolini 1871, p. 167.
90 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 8, 11, op. cit., p. 166–167 (sC 204).
91 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 8, 9, op. cit., p. 166–167 (sC 204).
92 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 13, 7, op. cit., p. 194–195 (sC 204).
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The conception of Lactantius, according to which “Dei Lex” is enough to govern 
mankind, has been and certainly has remained alien to the spirit of the European 
post-Byzantine jurists. For example, with us, with the Romanians, this process 
of estrangement from the “Divine Law” grew larger during the reign of Cuza Vodă 
(1859–1866), and then amplified during the period of the communist regime (1947–
1989). Actually, not even to this day do we have magistrates or jurists to apodictically 
state that we do not need punishments, prisons and “iustitiae opera,” as Lactantius 
wrote at the beginning of the Ivth century in his Book entitled “De Justitia.”
Consequently, we can justly ask ourselves if, despite the tomes of laws published 
since then, mankind has progressed or not regarding the perception on the nature 
of Law (Jus/ris) and on the procedure of application of the law, which still lacks the 
grain of humanism with which it had once been endowed by this Christian writer, 
apologist, rhetor and lawyer, Lactantius.
About the two notions, “justitia” (justice) and “aequitas” (equity), – to which 
both the poets and the philosophers of the Antiquity and the Roman jurists explic-
itly referred, and which Lactantius perceived first of all as virtues, always relating 
them to the Christian moral Law, – it must be said that they hold a foremost po-
sition in the text of the main juridical instruments of the European Union as well, 
but with a different connotation and a different aim.
One of the principal activity domains of the European Council is the “harmoni-
zation of the juridical systems” of the eu States, which supposes the construction 
in common of a Europe founded on the principles of the “Rule of law,” in which 
the aims pursued are: to promote law, “as a instrument of democracy,” to defend 
“human rights” and improve the efficiency “of justice by proposing more flexible 
juridical procedures,” meant to help find “common solutions to the new juridical 
and ethical problems…”93
That one cannot reach a “harmonization of the juridical systems” of the States 
of the European Union unless there is an efficient justice in this States, at the same 
time making use of flexible judicial procedures, this is, doubtlessly, a peremptory 
reality. Yet, how do today’s theorists of Law perceive the notion of Justice? In what 
terms do they define it?!
93 Consiliul Europei. Structură şi funcţionare (The European Council. Structure and Operation), 
in: Manualul Consiliului Europei (The European Council Textbook), edited by the Information Office 
of the European Council from Bucharest, Bucharest 2006, p. 218–219.
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 Usually, today’s theorists do not refer to the classical definition, inherited from 
the Roman jurisprudence (Celsus, Gaius, Ulpianus etc.), but content themselves 
with simply stating that Justice “supposes options and solutions based on the de-
mands of justice, morality and correctness both in the process of elaboration of law, 
and in the process of application of the juridical norms.”94 At the same time, they 
insist that, viewed as a principle of law, “the idea of justice dominates the positive 
norms of law,” and “embodies the ideal in the social order…”95
Article 6 from the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms”96 – which is actually truly a European constitutional text, with 
the force of Jus cogens, concerning the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, – explicitly foresees the right of every person “to a fair and public hear-
ing,…” (Art. 6 al. 1). Actually, the European Court of Human Rights also mentioned 
that “by protecting the right to a fair trial, Article 6 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights aims to protect the principle of preeminence of law, indissolubly 
related to the notions of democratic society and rule of law.”97
Regarding equity, as a general principle of Law, the respective theorists say 
that it supposes “the legislator’s moderation in prescribing rights and obliga-
tions in the process of elaboration of the juridical norms,” and “impartiality 
in the distribution of advantages and disadvantages in the activity of the organs 
applying the law.”98
Certainly, in the Rule of Law, the principle of equity must be affirmed “both 
in the legislative process and in the daily activity related to the application of the law.” 
Consequently, based on this principle, one has to eliminate the situations of favor-
itisms triggered by some regulations of different individuals and of disadvantages 
94 G. Costachi, P. Hlipcă, Organizarea şi funcţionarea puterii în Statul de drept (The Organization 
and the Functioning of Power in the Rule of Law), 2
nd
 ed., Chişinău 2011, p. 62–63.
95 G. Costachi, P. Hlipcă, Organizarea, op. cit., p. 63.
96 This Convention was adopted in Rome, on 4 November 1950, and entered into force on Septem-
ber 3, 1953. However, Romania ratified it only in the year 1994 (cf. “Monitorul Oficial” (Official Journal) 
1994, no. 135 / May 31). The Convention was amended by numerous Protocols, out of which we shall 
remind of the Protocol no. 11, entered into force on November 1, 1998. Finally, we shall mention that 
a “Convention” is an obligatory juridical instrument for the Member States of the European Council, 
but also for the Member States ratifying it.
97 R. Chiriţă, Convenţia europeană a drepturilor omului. Comentarii şi explicaţii (The European 
Convention on Human Rights. Comments and Explanations), 2
nd
 ed., Bucharest 2008, p. 194.
98 G. Costachi, P. Hlipcă, Organizarea, op. cit., p. 61.
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for others. Impartiality and fairness must represent the guiding ideas both for the 
legislator and for the judge.”99
But, all these statements and observations of the theorists of Law, of our times, 
can be found in fact – at least in their embryonic state – in those maxims of the 
Roman jurists about Law, about its nature and its goal etc., namely in those “juris-
prudentiae” also known and explained by the rhetor and lawyer Lactantius, and 
which, after he became a Christian, he expressed and applied in the new spirit 
of Jesus Christ’s Evangel.
In the perception of the Christian jurist Lactantius, “Lex Dei” (the Law of God) 
is enough to govern mankind, and the two fundamental values of the Roman Law, 
namely “justitia” and “aequitas,” are first of all two virtues that the theorists and 
the practitioners of Law of our times should take into account, if they really want 
to prove that they, too, know the history and the philosophy of man’s fundamental 
rights and freedoms, as the Christian writer and lawyer of Latin language, Lactan-
tius, did.
Among others, in his work, entitled “De Justitia” (On Justice), from “Divinae 
Institutiones” (Divine Institutions), Lactantius wrote also that “… those who ig-
nore the sacred mystery of man (sacramentum hominis), and by this rely in their 
judgement only on the acts of this temporal life (hanc temporalem vitam), cannot 
know the force of justice (vis justitiae).”100
According to the statement of Lactantius, those who ignore the Mystery of Cre-
ation – culminating in the act of man’s creation101 – cannot therefore know the 
force of Divine justice either. Indeed, the “judex” who ignores its sacredness and 
its mystery is meant to oscillate throughout his life only within the register of the 
temporal life, and make use only of the justice of men.
Instead of Conclusions
Our highlighting and delineation of the content of the two virtues, “Justitia” and 
“Aequitas,” have certainly been due to the pioneering contribution of the Christian 
99 G. Costachi, P. Hlipcă, Organizarea, op. cit., p. 62.
100 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 17, 15, op. cit., p. 216–217 (sC 204).
101 About this sacred character of man’ creation, see for more details N. V. Dură, Man in the View 
of some Christian Theologians with Philosophical Background, “Annals of the Academy of Romanian 
Scientists, Series on Philosophy, Psychology, Theology and Journalism” 5 (2013) no. 1–2, p. 75–97.
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North-African writer, Lactantius, who, due to his juridical, rhetorical and philo-
sophical training, managed to bring to light the message of the Evangel of Christ, 
and to elucidate their implications in the juridical area, namely in the domain 
of Law, as well.
The work of Lactantius “De Justitia” remains one of reference not just for the-
ologians, but also for jurists, philosophers, politologists etc., especially regarding 
the way in which the two values – with a religious-moral content, namely “Justitia” 
(Justice) and “Aequitas” (Equity), – were perceived and defined by a remarkable 
Christian writer, jurist and philosopher, of Latin expression, towards the beginning 
of the Ivth century.
Among others, from the hermeneutical analysis of the text of the work “De 
Justitia” (On Justice) – although brief – it has been possible to notice and keep 
in mind the fact that for Lactantius “Justitia” (Justice) is “the supreme virtue,” 
whose origin and reason lie in its main constitutive virtues – namely in “Pietas” 
and in “Aequitas” – which he called “fontes” (sources), because in these ones reside 
“tota justitia”102 (the whole justice). But, “caput” (the beginning) and “origo” (the 
origin) of Justice (Justitiae) – Lactantius mentioned – is nevertheless “Pietas,” while 
“Aequitas” is “vis omnis ac ratio”103 (the power and the reason of all).
The text of the same work allows one to also note that for Lactantius “Pietas” 
(Piety) “… nihil aluid quam Dei notio” (is nothing else but the (latreutic) worship 
of God), “sicut et Trismeghistus verissime definit”104 (as Trismeghistos defined 
it as well).
Regarding “Aequitas,” it has to be noticed the fact that, according to the per-
ception of Lactantius, it consists in “… se cum caeteris coaequandi”105 (making 
oneself equal to the others), namely situating oneself on the same social level, that 
is, on a level of equality, “… quam Cicero aequabilitatem vocat”106 (which Cicero 
calls equitability).
In his work, “De Justitia,” Lactantius also underlined the fact that “… Deus homi- 
nes generat” (God created men), and made them “omnes aequos”107 (all equal), 
102 Lactance, Divinae Institutiones V, Xv B, op. cit., p. 597 (PL 6).
103 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 14, 11, op. cit., p. 202 (sC 204).
104 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 14, 11, op. cit., p. 202 (sC 204).
105 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 14, 15, op. cit., p. 204 (sC 204).
106 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 14, 15, op. cit., p. 204 (sC 204).
107 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 14, 16, op. cit., p. 204 (sC 204).
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“id est pares esse voluit”108 (namely he wanted them to be all equal). So, according 
to the perception of Lactantius, this equality among men is therefore a natural 
result of the divine Creation, and not of the human society, wherefrom the moral 
character of this kind of “equality” of “jure divino.”
Concerning this social status of equality, with which all men are born, Lactantius 
insisted that, “ubi non sunt universi pares, aequitas non est; et excludit inequal-
itas ipsa justitiam, cujus vis omnis in eo est, ut pares faciat eos qui ad hujus vitae 
conditionem pari sorte venerunt”109 (where they are not equal, there is no equality, 
and inequality excludes justice, whose sense is precisely to make equal those who 
have come in the same way, with the same fate /destiny, in this life).
We also need to emphasize and remember that for the African jurist and apolo-
gist, “inequality” among men is exactly what “excludes justice” (excludit justitiam), 
which he derives “… from the knowledge of God, from piety and from the moral 
equality among men…”110
Quoting of Lactantius’ work, one of the exceptional canonists of the last 
century, Professor Liviu Stan,111 wrote that, “… springing from Piety,” namely from 
the act of honoring God, “Law is conditioned in its existence and in its function 
by Religion”.112 Indeed, for Lactantius the Law has the objective ground of its 
existence and its supreme ontic principle in “Jus divinum.” Moreover, its reason 
to be is none other than “to preserve equality among people”113, the equality 
ordained by the Creator and assumed by those who were made “in His image 
and likeness,” wherefrom also the conclusion that the “power” of Jus (of Law) 
resides precisely “in this equality”114 (among men), which is part of the Creed 
of the Christian Religion.
The fact that Lactantius conditioned the preservation of the spirit of justice 
on the accomplishment of good deeds is abundantly attested by the statement 
he makes in the same work, namely, “Servire antem Deo nihil aliud est, quam 
108 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 14, 16, op. cit., p. 204 (sC 204).
109 Lactance, Institutions Divines V, 14, 20, op. cit., p. 204 (sC 204).
110 L. Stan, Ontologia Juris, op. cit., p. 118.
111 Our regrettable departed professor excelled in the domains of Canon Law, both Orthodox and 
Roman-Catholic, History of the Juridical-Canonical Institutions of Europe, Compared Law, Philosophy 
of Law etc.
112 L. Stan, Ontologia Juris, op. cit., p. 118.
113 L. Stan, Ontologia Juris, op. cit., p. 118.
114 L. Stan, Ontologia Juris, op. cit., p. 118.
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bonis operibus tueri et conservare justitiam”115 (Serving God is nothing else but 
to contemplate His good deeds and to maintain justice). Actually, taking over 
a quotation from Cicero (De Republica III, 22), Lactantius wrote that “God is the 
spring of Law,” and that the latter is conditioned by the “moral Law”.116
Certainly, only a jurist as impressive, as competent and with an attitude like 
the one of Lactantius could have awakened the conscience of the Emperor Con-
stantine – at least indirectly through his mother Helen, or through his son Krispos, 
whom he was teaching at the Imperial Court, – on the fact that “the peace of the 
Empire” depended on the “peace with God,” wherefrom the affirmation of this 
principle even in the text of the Edict of Milan. But, unfortunately, this sui-generis 
contribution of Lactantius – which also had a decisive role in the process of genesis 
of the Edict of Milan – has not yet been emphasized by the specialized literature, 
wherefrom our obligation to read – with interest and competence – the text of the 
works of this jurist and rhetor of Proconsular Africa, and, certainly, particularly the 
one suggestively entitled, “De Justitia,” whose content questions at the same time 
the theologians, the jurists, the philosophers, the historians, the politologists, the 
sociologists of our times etc..
From the brief hermeneutical analysis of the text of Lactantius’s work “De 
Justitia” (On Justice), – whose references we have corroborated both with the 
Roman and the European juridical doctrine of our times, and with the basic prin-
ciples of the Christian Orthodox teaching, – it has been possible to notice that 
in the conception of this prodigious Christian writer of Latin language – a rhetor 
and a lawyer by training and by profession – “Justitia” (Justice) and “Aequitas” 
(Equity) are above all two moral virtues, with certain implications and juridical 
consequences, wherefrom the moral obligation of any legislator – wherever and 
whoever he may be – to also take them into account in the application of the 
act of justice.
Anyhow, it is not doubt that this moral obligation is a categorical imper-
ative of our times, confirmed actually even by the text of the main juridical 
115 Lactance (Lactantius), Institutiones Divines (Divinae Institutiones) III, 9, 15, http://remacle.
org/bloodwolf/eglise/lactance/instit3.htm; see also Lactance, Divinae Institutiones, trad. in romanian 
P. Pistol, Timişoara 2004, p. 127.
116 Lactantius, Divinae Institutiones et epitome divinarum institutionum, vI, 8, in: L. Caeli Firmiani 
Lactanti opera omnia, pars 1, ed. S. Brandt, Pragae–Vindobonae–Lipsiae 1890, p. 660–661 (Corpus 
Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, 19). Concerning the text from Cicero, see M. T. Ciceronis, 
De Republica, ed. A. Maio, editio prima Americana, Bostonae 1823, p. 99.
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instruments of the European Union,117 with an obligatory juridical force, such 
as, for example, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
(Rome 1950), The Charter of Fundamental Rights (Nice, 2001) and the Treaty of 
Lisbon (2007).
SummaRy
O „Justitia” (sprawiedliwości) i „Aequitas” (słuszności). 
Wkład Laktancjusza († 325) w określenie treści dwóch 
elementów składowych „Jus” (prawa) – streszczenie
Po krótkiej analizie tekstu pracy Laktancjusza zatytułowanego „Justitia” można powie-
dzieć, że terminy „Justitia” (sprawiedliwość) i „Aequitas” (słuszności) są przede wszystkim 
dwiema cnotami moralnymi, o teologiczno-filozoficznych i prawnych implikacjach i kon-
sekwencjach, stąd też istnieje moralny obowiązek, aby każdy prawodawca – gdziekolwiek 
i kimkolwiek by nie był – ma brać je pod uwagę przy wymierzaniu sprawiedliwości.
Słowa kluczowe: cnoty, sprawiedliwość, myślenie prawno-filozoficzne, implikacje moralne, 
konsekwencje prawne
About “Justitia” (Righteousness) and “Aequitas” (Equity). 
The contribution of Lactantius († 325) in the specifying 
of the content of the two constituent elements of the “Jus” – 
summary
By a brief analysis of the text of Lactantius’s work, entitled „Justitia,” one can say that for 
Lactantius, „Justitia” (Justice) and „Aequitas” (Equity) were primarily two moral virtues, 
with theological-philosophical and juridical implications and consequences, hence the 
moral obligation that any legislator – wherever and whoever he may be – ought to take 
them into account in the application of Justice.
117 See C. Mititelu, The European Convention on Human Rights, in: 10th Edition of International 
Conference The European Integration – Realities and Perspectives, Galati 2015, p. 243–252; N. V. Dură, 
C. Mititelu, The Treaty of Nice, European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, in: 8th Edition of In-
ternational Conference The European Integration – Realities and Perspectives Proceedings, Galati 2013, 
p. 123–129; N. V. Dură, C. Mititelu, The Human Fundamental Rights and Liberties in the Text of some 
Declarations of the Council of Europe, in: International Conference “Exploration, Education and Progress 
in the Third Millennium.” Proceedings, vol. 1, no. 5, Bucharest 2015, p. 7–22.
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